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Introduction 1
Trade regime facilitating and promoting international transactions is only one of many ingredients that are indispensable to put a country on the path of sustainable economic growth.
Without effective political system, fully liberalized prices, environment friendly to private business and investment, macroeconomic stability, even the best trade regime will fail to trigger supply response and accomplish this objective.
Yet, this should not suggest that reforming foreign trade regime could wait till other components are in place. To the contrary, unreformed trade institutions could perpetuate or lead to the emergence of huge rent-seeking opportunities and opposition to reforms. These groups The Iraqi reform package, announced at the annual meeting of the World Bank and International Monetary Fund in Dubai, has already come under attack. It has been dubbed neoconservative, extreme, etc. New York Times' reporter Jeff Maddrick (2003) observes that by mainstream economist's standards introduced measures are extreme and "in fact stunning," He writes: "The current plan is supported neither by theory nor experience, only by the wishful ideological thinking of its advocates. Its consequences, as in Russia, could be widespread cruelty."
This observation misses the point completely, as Russia neither adopted radical shock nor opened its economy to external competition. Russia's fatal experience was not with swift liberalization, as, for instance, Dabrowski and Antczak (1996) have convincingly shown. To the contrary, exclusion of oil, non-ferrous and other easily marketable raw materials from price liberalization fueled rent 1 This is a revised version of a paper presented at an internal CASE seminar "Economic Reforms in Iraq" on September 17, 2003. The views expressed in this paper are solely mine and do not represent views of any organization with which I am affiliated. I gratefully acknowledge very helpful discussions, direct and through internet, with Marek Belka, Marek Dabrowski, and Saumya Mitra. I benefited also from comments made by participants at the seminar. The usual caveats apply.
2 See the CPA Orders Number 37 (taxes), 38 (reconstruction levy on imports), 39 (foreign investment), and 40
(banking), all issued last September, available at the Iraq Coalition Provisional Authority website http://www.cpairaq.org/regulations.
seeking and more importantly the emergence of powerful 'newly-rich' group of oligarchs that subsequently blocked measures increasing competition in the Russian economy.
Furthermore, CPA's measures are neither as radical as they are portrayed nor do they ignore the experience of transition from central planning. Corporate income tax of 15 percent is hardly stunning. In fact, it is 15 percentage points higher than in Estonia (zero corporate income tax rate), 2.5 percentage points higher than in Ireland. It is the same as in Lithuania and Latvia (beginning in 2004) , and 3 percentage points lower than in Hungary in 2003. Next year, it will be only one percentage point higher than in Hungary and four percentage points higher than in Poland and
Slovakia. This hardly strikes one as extremism.
Neither is a 5 percent reconstruction levy, a uniform tariff rate under a different label, such a radical and irresponsible measure. Consider that a simple average MFN (Most Favored Nation)
tariff rate levied on imports in industrial economies was 4 percent in 1999. Estonia, Hong Kong, Singapore had zero, and Latvia or Uruguay 5 percent. 3 While these criticisms may demonstrate the lack of knowledge of contemporary economics in general and that of economics of transition in particular, they cannot be ignored. They are strongly reminiscent of the debate: radicalism versus gradualism of the early 1990s. While the field was then open for speculations, now at least we have abundance of empirical evidence. Gradualism in the first-generation reforms (liberalization of prices, foreign trade, business entry, and current account convertibility) enriched few at the expense of general economic welfare and inflicted huge economic costs. Capture of reforms by private interests for their own enrichment has been trademark in a number of transition economies including Russia and Ukraine.
Hence, directing entrepreneurial talents towards welfare enhancing activities rather than exploiting rent opportunities should be one of the major concerns of those responsible for reforms.
The design of foreign trade and investment institutions and policies together with price liberalization plays an important role in it. They all should subject domestic actors to competition from outside.
But should the CPA or the future Iraqi government decide on the course of economic reforms?
It would be tempting to argue that only a legitimate government acceptable to the Iraqi population can make decisions with impact on the future of Iraq. But there are many governments with little, or none, legitimacy that make similar decisions without objections from international community.
However, much more important to the point is that sound economic policy decisions can rarely withstand domestic political pressures unless the economy is in a deep crisis. The pressure coming from banks, international financial institutions and creditor governments has provided the necessary stimulus to domestic reforms in debt-trapped developing countries in the 1980s.
Economic crisis drove the move away from central planning in the late 1980s. In brief, external actors may prevail over domestic politics. While many areas of public policy reforms (e.g.,
privatization of large state-owned enterprises) may require their 'local ownership,' most are more likely to be implemented with huge economic welfare benefits for the population writ large by external actors.
In fact, the largest service that the CPA can render the Iraqi people is to introduce potentially painful and politically unpopular reform that are indispensable to set the economy on the path of sustainable economic growth, before the Iraq government fully emerges though democratic process. The 'new' government may dismantle some of these -in fact, many potential investors are deeply concerned with a possible turn-around to opaque administrative arrangements characteristic of Middle Eastern economies. Yet, there is a good chance that many good reforms survive domestic political scrutiny once they demonstrate their effectiveness in meeting policy goals and once general public appreciates transparency and lower potential for corruption. While none of these guarantees irreversibility, this is a better option than keeping in place old regulations that would effectively block reconstruction effort and economic recovery of Iraq.
The remainder of this paper is organized as follows. Section 1 seeks to reproduce from partner statistics developments in Iraq foreign trade, including the scope of illicit trade, and outlines major features of foreign trade regime before the 2003 war. This regime had contributed to the emergence of large group of people with significant financial assets, which has significant implications for reforms. Keeping competition out would only increase their hold over the Iraqi economy. Section 2 reviews arguments in favor of protection. The examination of Iraqi export performance shows that there had been almost nothing left to protect and no case can be made even for 'infant protection.' Section 3 makes the argument for free trade. Section 4 explains why a free trade regime does not usually emerge as a result of the domestic reform process, but needs an external push. Section 5 concludes.
Foreign trade regime and sanctions: implications for reforms
Saddam's foreign trade regime was reminiscent of foreign trade arrangements under orthodox, unreformed central planning, albeit with many caveats. For starters, although the scope of state controls was similarly pervasive, the size of the private sector was much larger. Furthermore, since the imposition of UN economic sanctions in 1990, it had a dual structure -a legal and illegal one, both under the direct Baathist control. In consequence, smuggling and access to authorities and foreign exchange allocations rather than tariffs and non-tariff measures shaped imports. This was a deeply corrupt regime. It had led to enrichment of a few well connected with implications for a broad spectrum of reforms ranging from foreign trade, foreign investment and privatization. How do trade data reported in mirror statistics match with the data from the UN Office of the Iraqi Program (OIP) in charge of the OFP? On the export side, there appears to be no significant differences with the revenue generated under the OFP of US$ 3.2 billion higher than total exports reported in IMF DOT statistics or 5.3 percent. 6 On the import side, the differences are much more significant with the value of all OFP "arrived" shipments (US$ 25 billion) 29 percent higher than the value of world exports to Iraq reported in IMF DOT statistics (US$ 18 billion). It appears that buyers of Iraqi goods (almost exclusively oil) appear to have provided more detailed information, whereas countries exporting to Iraq were reluctant (or simply too sloppy) to disclose in their statistics all relevant information. This was so despite the fact that the difference refers to transactions under the OFP, fully conforming to international norms.
Duality of foreign trade regime
Trade with Iraq reported to the DOT database by some countries was surprisingly low despite close geographical proximity and anecdotal evidence suggesting much more significant flows.
Syria and Turkey, for instance, reported no trade activity in the OFP period to the IMF DOT statistics -Turkey since 1996 and Syria since 1997. 7 Turkey continued, however, its trade relationship with Iraq in the 19977-02 period even seeking exemption from the UN sanction regime Turkey and through Iranian waters provided it with "… more than $1 billion a year in cash -which goes directly to Saddam." (Lederer, 2001 ).
These estimates appear to have solid foundations. Consider first, for instance, that Syrian gateway alone could have generated almost US$ 1 billion in extra exports in 2001. Following the opening of an oil pipeline through Syria, both countries signed a swap agreement under which Syria used Iraqi oil sold at a 50 percent discount and exported an equivalent of its own oil.
Reportedly, this line was used to smuggle $2 million worth of oil daily (Recknagel 2001) . On an annual basis, this would amount to around US$ 800 million of illicit exportation bypassing the UN OFP, which required that all Iraqi oil revenues be placed in a UN-supervised escrow account for spending only for approved purchases.
Second, Turkey appears to have been also heavily involved in imports bypassing the OFP.
According to Katzman (2002) , the Turkish government regulated and taxed about US$ 400 million of illicit imports of Iraqi energy products per year. It is not clear whether the above estimate includes US$ 400 million worth of oil that was apparently smuggled by trucks into Turkey 12 "In the program's first four years, France won more than $3 billion in contracts. But this year it was eclipsed by Egypt as Iraq's top trade partner, and now French companies are likely to be getting fewer contracts." See Lederer (202) . 13 One assumes that both Australia and France have provided accurate trade statistical information. 14 The total was arrived as follows: Egypt's and Russia's estimated exports were around US$ 550 million each;
Syria's around 500 million; and Turkey's 160 million. (Recknagel 2001 the assumption underlying these estimates is that 50 percent of illicit revenues were spent on imports. This is, however, only an assumption without any empirical evidence.
But whatever the actual levels of imports were, the scope for enrichment to the well connected in both private and state sector had been clearly enormous. Unaccounted expenditures run in hundred of millions, if not billions dollars. On top of illicit transactions, black market operations and smuggling, one should add informal commissions paid often by suppliers under the OFP to Iraqi officials. While some of these fortunes have been responsible for surge in prices of real estate in elegant districts of Amman, much of it is in Iraq. According to one source, Iraq has around 3,000
families each with the net worth estimated in millions of dollars up from about 50 thirty-five years ago with the wealthiest controlling billions of dollars (Yasseen 2003) . It is clear that intimate association with the regime allowed many, if not most of them to increase their wealth.
Political economy implications for reforms
The most direct implication is that arrangements that allowed collecting rents should be terminated. As Yasseen (2003) 
Arguments for Protection
Arguments Third, it is argued that in the absence of protection there would be no industrialization and the agricultural sector would be devastated by subsidized exports from highly developed countries. As 16 The World Bank estimates overall stock reconstruction needs in 14 priority sectors to be in the order of US$36
billion. The CPA's estimate for sectors not covered by the World Bank/UN assessment, including security and oil, is US$ 20 billion.
for industrial protectionism, poverty or unemployment considerations, rather than infant industry argument, tend to form its cornerstone under circumstances peculiar to the Iraqi economy.
Liberalization would then lead to the persistence of high levels of unemployment due to the inability of the Iraqi industrial sector to withstand competitive pressure from imports. As Fadhil Mahdi from the UNDP stated: "Iraq's technological prowess in the civilian sector is worse than Russia's in the 90's. Opening up to competition at a mere 5 percent tariff will most probably ruin many producers and exacerbate unemployment." 17
The stakes are high, as the state sector has been an important employer in Iraq. Since many assets were looted, most state-owned enterprises do not produce anything at the moment and most employees get paychecks from CPA. It is rather doubtful that a tariff of 15 or 20 percent would save these enterprises from bankruptcy.
However, the question germane in this context is whether trade policy is the most efficient instrument to address the unemployment issue. The answer is emphatically negative. If something has to be done, explicit subsidies are better than tariffs for that purpose. Consider the consequences of using tariffs to protect selected industrial sectors. What level of tariff rates would assure their re-birth and survival? One suspects that they would have to be set at a very high level, simply because historically Iraqi SOEs were not exposed to international competition and their assets had been largely destroyed. Like SOEs in centrally planned economies, political rather than economic considerations were behind their emergence. The industrial structure erected in Iraq under state-run import-substituting strategy reflects neither Iraq's endowment in factors of production or, consequently, its comparative advantage. Even without surveys taking stock of assets and liabilities of SOEs, one may reach the conclusion that three decades of economic negligence, war economy, sanctions and, more recently, looting has resulted in the total absence of value added that could be generated by SOEs at international prices. (US$ 1.7 million), electrical equipment (US$ 1.5 million down from US$ 28 million in 1997), and Hence, assuring the survival of SOEs, or for that matter of whatever has been left of manufacturing would probably require affording very high levels of protection to selective sectors of the economy. The resulting 'cascade-type' tariff structure would negatively impact Iraq's economic performance through higher domestic prices, erosion of competitiveness of non-protected firms and distortions in the choice of future activities. Tariffs are the implicit tax with efficiency (resource cost) and equity (income redistribution) implications. High tariffs on products of SOEs would lead to higher domestic prices. Glancing at a list of SOEs, these would include higher prices for cement, cotton, fertilizers, iron and steel, petrochemicals, paper, etc. Many of these products are used as inputs in other sectors. This would contribute to higher prices in other sectors. If these were significantly above world prices, they would be unable to withstand international competition.
Capital would then move from 'genuinely' competitive sectors to 'artificially' competitive sectors further exacerbating welfare loss. 18 The GL index of intra-industry trade between two partners is usually expressed as:
, where X and M are exports of a country and imports by a partner correspondingly of product i. The index suffers from two problems: aggregation and aggregate trade imbalances.
Since the uniform tariff schedule minimizes distortions in production and distribution, would a uniform tariff rate provide a stimulus to the development of domestic industrial production? For the reasons discussed above, it would have to be set at a relatively high level. Neutrality notwithstanding this would lead to a strong anti-foreign trade bias with huge impact on domestic prices.
What about extending protectionist umbrella only to agriculture? Around one-third of Iraqi population live in rural area and this sector enjoys high level of protection in most developed and developing countries including Middle East. Iraq has always been a net importer of agricultural products. As can be seen from data tabulated in Table 3 Exports of food products registered much stronger recovery than agricultural materials. The latter stood at 4 percent of their exports in 1989 (Figure 2 ). Since imports of agricultural materials have also significantly declined, this may indicate the increase in production for domestic use.
The protection of this sector is usually justified in terms of national security, social stability, and subsidized exports from highly developed countries. But none of these seems to withstand scrutiny when cast against Iraq's circumstances. Agricultural self-sufficiency is not a feasible option, and market-driven profile of agricultural output, given Iraq's climate, soil and endowment in water, is probably significantly different than subsidized export baskets from countries located in temperate climate and abundant in water. Furthermore, a special argument for protection of the agricultural sector does not seem to apply to a sector devastated by underinvestment and misallocation of resources further exacerbated by subsidies (especially of water). 19 It seems that it would only delay the transition to a market-based agricultural system. 19 Since imports are now not subject to duties or any other administrative restrictions, the usual argument for gradualism in removal protection to calibrate to cropping patterns does not apply.
Political Economy and 'External' Arguments for Free Trade
By almost any mainstream economist's standards, free trade extended not only to goods but also to services is the best trade policy. Fully liberalized transportation and telecommunication, in particular, followed by financial services assure competition and remove important barriers to trade faced by many developing countries. The theoretical argument, even accounting for strategic trade theory, in favor of free trade is overwhelming.
On purely economic grounds, this is the best solution in particular for an oil-rich economy with devastated industrial structure for at least two reasons. First, only competition from imports combined with a friendly business/investment climate can produce industrial restructuring in line with Iraq's endowment in factor of production and comparative advantage.
Second, low foreign trade related transaction cost keeps the prices of tradables low. Since most basic food staples are imported, border and non-border charges would raise prices of these products. This implicit tax would have particularly negative impact on the urban poor.
Leaving aside standard arguments, there are also other political economy aspects related to the existing free trade agreements and issues of governance favoring the adoption of a free trade regime. Free trade regime is not only about tariffs on trade in goods. In order to tap its full benefits, non-tariff measures should be kept to the minimum and services should be open to competition.
These are briefly discussed in turn below.
Bilateral regional liberalization
Since Iraq has already been involved in bilateral regional liberalization, some portion of its imports will enter its markets free of duties provided that the new government honors these agreements. According to the Ministry of Trade, the government has signed free trade agreements (FTA) with 11 Arab countries. Most of these agreements were signed in 2001-02 as part of Iraq's concerted effort to skirt the UN international trade embargo. The Internet search has identified ten countries (Table 4) . 20
20 Oman may be one that had signed FTA with Iraq but no agency or press information was found to confirm it. Egyptian trade officials. Quotes from official data in both countries suggest that actual trade was significantly larger, although it remains unclear the extent to which it involved re-exports or other operations -as argued earlier -circumventing the UN trade sanction regime.
Hence, while it is impossible to give even a rough estimate, it seems that the share of Arab FTA partners was probably twice as high as indicated in the IMF DOT database. This should not suggest, however, they will be able to maintain this share once trade with Iraq is conducted in accordance with market rules and its domestic markets are fully contestable.
On the other hand, however, with the normalization of Iraqi external trade relations, the share of other partners, especially that of the European Union, United States and East Asia (in particular South Korea and Taiwan) is likely to significantly expand. Hence, unusually trade turnovers with some Middle East countries are unlikely to persist in the future.
The share of trade exempt from tariffs because of preferential agreements may expand.
Consider that Iraq will be under strong pressure to observe the existing FTAs in order not to antagonize its Arab neighbors. For these reasons, the new government may not only want to continue the Arab path of regional trade liberalization but also extend the existing network to members of Cooperation Council for the Arab States of the Gulf (GCC), i.e., Saudi Arabia, Oman, and United Arab Emirates. Furthermore, these pressures for bilateral liberalization will not only come from regional partners that remain now outside the Iraqi network but also from two major The EU is following a slightly different track with the "Wider Europe -Neighborhood" initiative.
It is negotiating FTA with the GCC while simultaneously it has been pushing under the Euro-Med cooperation framework for free trade area among EU associates -Egypt, Jordan, Morocco and Tunisia. Iraq already has FTAs with all these countries except Morocco. It also borders Turkey, which enjoys EU accession status. Inclusion of Iraq into a free trade area with the EU cannot be dismissed.
While it is impossible to predict with any degree of certainty, the share of preferential partners in Iraq's imports in the coming years, the historical data -with all due qualifications concerning their quality (see Section 3 above) -would suggest that around 75-95 percent of Iraqi imports may not be subject to MFN tariffs. Even assuming very likely asymmetries in respective schedules of tariff removal in a possible EU or US-Iraq free trade agreement, i.e., longer periods for Iraq, the share of duty free imports encompassing products not manufactured in Iraq would be quite significant. Furthermore, consider that the US' direct involvement in reconstruction will inevitably lead to much larger US exports than in the past. Assuming the increase in this share to its pre-Gulf War level of 12 percent, potential preferential imports would account for around two-thirds of the total Iraqi imports. Even without the EU-Iraq FTA, whatever the combined share of Arab and US imports into Iraq might be, it is rather unlikely than it would be lower than one-third of total imports.
But in fact the actual share might be significantly higher, as the possibility of obtaining dutyfree access will undoubtedly provide incentive to cheat on certificates of origin. The strength of the incentive will depend on the extent of reverse discrimination, i.e., magnitudes of preferential margins. For countries with weak administrative capacities, the scope of fraudulent certificates of origin may be quite substantive. 21 This takes us to the relationship between free trade and governance.
21 Examples abound. BMW automobiles entering Georgia as 'Made in Russia,' or a whole range of products that entered the Province of Kosovo as produced in Macedonia, although the latter had never produce them.
Governance and other issues
The inevitable legacy of pre-war foreign trade regime is that Iraq will face serious weaknesses in governance specific to the conduct of international trade. Customs was widely viewed as being an oppressive and corrupt system. It appears, therefore, that both the human resources and the physical infrastructure in Customs are inadequate to facilitate trade. Furthermore, the difficulty in assuring uniform treatment across points-of-entry into Iraqi customs territory, exacerbated by differences between the Northern part and Central and Southern parts, will only increase with the growth in administrative complexity of a foreign trade regime.
The great advantage of free trade regime is that it is simple and almost immune to mismanagement. It drastically reduces administrative burden on Customs Administration and other government agencies. By the same token, it also significantly diminishes the potential for corruption, as it removes, albeit not completely, 'money' from daily customs dealings with traders.
In fact, several important administrative burdens disappear when a country adheres to a dutyfree regime. For starters, neither Customs nor traders have reasons to bargain over the 'real' value of a shipment. There is no need for administration in charge of solving possible disputes arising over valuation. The trader has no incentive to bribe a customs officer to lower the assessment. In addition, classification of imported products loses its significance, as duties do not depend on how customs classifies an item. (Misclassification of products is often used to extract payments from traders).
Another complex and contentious issue that disappears with a duty-free regime relates to the determination of origins of imports. Customs still has to collect information but only for statistical purposes. There is no reason to discriminate against sources of imports, as preferential/discriminatory treatment looses its relevance.
The raison d'être of various administrative arrangements designed to mitigate anti-foreign trade bias inherent in foreign trade regimes discriminating against imports in favor of domestic products and services disappears as well. These include export processing and other special economic zones established to avoid cumbersome administrative formalities and customs, and various schemes of tariff rebates (customs drawbacks, etc.) granted to exporters. They are administratively complicated -not to mention that they are usually not very effective in encouraging exports. Moreover, products form local firms located in special economic zones and enjoying access to duty free imports and often tax holidays very often find their ways into local markets creating unfair competition for other domestic firms and depriving the government of tax revenues.
In short, duty-free trade regime applied to all imports creates relatively transparent and simple administrative environment devoid of a number of opportunities for corruption and rent seeking.
This in turn substantially lowers the 'hassle cost' of conducting business operations in a country.
In addition, there is a highly pragmatic reason not to have Customs involved in clearance, customs evaluation and collecting duties on shipments into Iraq. Its customs infrastructure is not fully operational as yet. Iraq had inland customs clearance facilities that -except for the Northern region where they remain largely intact -were either destroyed or looted during the war (Kelly et al. 2003) .
Liberal conditions in access: other prerequisites
Tariff rates, even if set at zero rates, may do little for a country to tap benefits offered by free trade as long as there other barriers to trade in place. While there is a whole array of non-tariff tools used by governments to discriminate against foreign suppliers, five policy-areas deserve special attention -the right of establishment, anti-trust regulations, import licensing, cumbersome border procedures, technical barriers to trade, and antidumping. Among 'behind-the-border' measures backbone services, i.e., telecommunications, transport, financial, distribution, and business services are particularly important, as they are crucial to trade in goods and facilitate resource flows between countries. In a nutshell, they call for the establishment of pro-competition environment.
Regulations concerning the right of establishment should assure that there is no discrimination against foreign firms seeking to establish a presence in the markets for goods and services. Both This should not suggest that Iraq should not have a functioning system of technical standards.
To the contrary, it will be needed for Iraqi industrial development, simply because standards promote economies of scale, protect public health or the environment, facilitate information exchange, comparison of products by consumers and market transactions through reduction of the costs of uncertainty.
Yet, Iraq should start with a modern market-based system driven by private sector.
Considering that this requires a functioning rule of law (liability laws, etc.), the process should not be rushed. It should avoid copying the practice of other countries in the Middle East of requiring that relevant testing on all imports be done at their national laboratories. Highly developed countries have simply better testing centers as well as standards adequately protecting public health and environment. Last but not least, it should simply adopt standards used in highly developed economies. This would allow exports to incur costs for national certification. 22 But there is clearly a legitimate issue of phyto-sanitary standards indispensable to protect public health and the environment. Since facilities are in a short supply, the task should be simplified, transparent and focused on a selected group of products that may pose significant public health risks. The balance should be struck between legitimate public health concerns and costs to traders. The list of agricultural products with highest potential to public health should be identified, and these products should be randomly inspected in border crossing points. As for expired pharmaceuticals, the customs would check for that.
The last potential non-tariff barrier relates to antidumping, which -with expansion of WTO disciplines to several non-tariff trade barriers -has become a favorite protectionist weapon used not only by developed but also increasingly by developing countries. One may expect that CPA will be pressurized to assist Ministry of Trade in developing an antidumping legislation designed to prevent imports at a price below the production cost.
This course of action should be resisted for several reasons. International experience and a large body of economic literature show that antidumping actions rarely, if at all, address cases that present real threat to competition. The existence of an antidumping legislation would simply increase the leverage of protectionist interests over the government. It breeds lobbying and corruption, and, in consequence, diverts scarce entrepreneurial talent into the political process. It absorbs scarce administrative and professional resources to activities that are inherently rent seeking. It creates temptation to resort to antidumping to cover whatever sort of import restrictions seems politically necessary.
An alternative superior to anti-dumping arrangements is the competition law enforcement agency with a statutory mandate to determine the net cost, taking into account the interests of both users of imports and producers, to the economy of proposed trade suppressing measures.
While this section focused exclusively on trade in goods, the issue of establishing a liberal regime for services is as, if not more, important. The international evidence suggests that low trade barriers in services create employment, reduce transaction costs and lower prices for both exports and imports. Firms are then more likely to penetrate foreign markets. While this calls for a more detailed analysis, opening of services to foreign competition along the lines covered by the WTO General Agreement on Services should be an integral part of a new trade regime for Iraq. The critical sectors are transportation and telecommunication, followed by financial services. These should be fully liberalized to assure competition and any notion of exclusivity for domestic carriers should be removed. 22 For the discussion of benefits of this approach, see World Bank (2003, p. 179) .
Conclusion
On top of purely economic considerations, there is a strong political economy argument in favor of a free trade regime, which takes into account unique circumstances of Iraq. It can be summarized as follows: The free trade regime will considerably reduce the administrative burden on state agencies -an important point considering Iraqi weak administrative capacities. It will increase transparency, simplicity and thus lower the potential for corruption. Special attention should be paid, however, to non-tariff barriers, as there will be pressure to introduce them in the absence of tariff protection. Last but not least, it will render irrelevant strive for tariff exemptions, free economic zones, export platforms, etc.
The fact that only few countries have a free trade regime, although an increasing numberincluding Middle East North African countries -are pursuing it, both unilaterally and in the regional setting, is testimony to the strength of private interest groups -often, entrenched elites benefiting from the status quo. It says nothing about the wisdom of pursuing this policy.
Stakeholder dilemma: can a free trade regime survive beyond CPA?
Ownership of a reform is very important. Reforms imposed from outside usually fail, as their implementation is sabotaged. While these observations apply to a number of areas including privatization, foreign trade institutions and policies are an exception. Had it not been for international pressures or economic crises, protectionism would prevail over liberalization in the conditions of market access. This stems from unique characteristics of the fact that foreign trade decisions are classic collective action problems with a huge asymmetry in incentives between beneficiaries and losers (Olson 1965 (Ray 1988 ).
The first-the micro view-suggests that foreign trade policy mirror the interaction between preferences of interest groups and politicians. The second-the macro view-accords the state considerable autonomy. It stresses national objectives and international commitments as major determinants of international trade policies. The former derive from values shared by political elite: these may range from commitment to free trade, on the one hand, and providing a trade restriction safety net for weak industries, on the other hand. International commitments refer to obligations under regional or multilateral agreements together with mechanisms for adjudicating trade disputes
But there is no guarantee that the Iraqi free foreign trade regime existence will withstand the pressures to which future governments will be subjected, as no institutional framework for foreign trade policy has been established as yet. The problem is that CPA Orders have not established institutional arrangements that would lock-in the present arrangements. The ultimate test of a sound institutional design for foreign trade is the extent to which it insulates the decision making process against capture by narrow interest groups. The importance of a good institutional design for foreign trade lies in its long term impact on policy making; give a country "... the institutions to make sound policy and you affect it for a decade" (Winters 1995, p.1) . In other words, a sound economic policy may quickly evaporate unless accompanied by the right institutions containing bad policies. This is the challenge that CPA faces before transferring powers to the Iraqi Governing Council.
Concluding comments
Iraq already has the best trade policy, although on a temporary basis and not extended to all imports and service sector facilitating trade (transportation, port management). This offers unique opportunity to put it on a permanent basis. The shock that usually accompanies shifting to a more open trade regime has already occurred. The introduction of tariffs would produce another unnecessary shock in an economy that has undergone a series of shocks over the past three decades.
But avoiding another shock is not the most important argument in favor of free foreign trade regime for goods and services. The elimination of a free trade regime would be counterproductive on several counts. First, it would fall short of saving the state sector, as this would require erecting a very high barrier against foreign competition.
Second, it would fall short of generating customs revenue, as imports exempted from duties either because of preferential agreements, fraudulent certificates or exemptions granted, would narrow trade tax base.
Third, the introduction of tariffs would put huge administrative burden on a very weak administration and would create opportunities for corruption. Given the administrative legacy of the Baath regime and limited high skilled human resources, this should be avoided.
Fourth, the introduction of tariffs or any other surcharges requiring payments based on the value of a shipment requires the existence of warehouses and other facilities indispensable to carry out customs clearance. Availability of equipment allowing for non-cash transactions also helps. Both appear not to be readily usable and available.
Last but not least, the introduction of a tariff schedule would tie to some extent the hands of the future Iraqi government in terms of how it wants to design its tariff schedule. Consider that introducing a free trade regime would likely encounter opposition from groups taking advantage of economic rents created by tariffs.
Yet, custom clearance and facility issues notwithstanding, an argument can be made in favor of a foreign trade regime as outlined in CPA Order 39 introducing a five percent flat reconstruction charge. Iraq faces huge reconstruction cost. Collecting taxes at the border is an attractive option in a country without a functioning tax administration. While still a second best option, the advantages of a 'reconstruction surcharge' trade regime are as follows: First, it assures the broadest possible trade tax base, as it will apply to all imports independently of their origin or use. The reconstruction surcharge as an emergency temporary measure falls under safeguard provisions of FTAs. Hence, there is no need to exempt imports from preferential partners. It also removes the administrative temptation to exempt from duties some imports on the grounds of their great importance to economic welfare of Iraq.
Second, it defers the decision concerning free trade agreements signed in the past by Iraq and leaves the future shape of trade institutions and policies in hands of a future government of Iraq.
Third, it not only defers the decision as to what to do with the legacy of FTAs but it also renders certificate of origins irrelevant for duty collection. Certificates of origin are then only relevant for statistical purpose. They do not bear fiscal consequences for traders and thus remove opportunity for corrupt behavior.
Fourth, it retains important advantages of duty free regime, i.e., that is neutrality, uniformity and considerable administrative simplicity. Although it erects an extra administrative burden of customs valuation, it eliminates other 'perverse' incentive such as misclassification of customs items. Furthermore, since this is a temporary measure, bureaucratic temptation to establish free or special economic zones will be tamed.
Last but not least, it increases the probability of survival of a free trade regime, although it does not guarantee it, once surcharge is removed. With the rate low of 5 percent, no large group benefiting from rents is likely to emerge and capture foreign trade policies.
